Since 1992, China and Israel have developed increasingly close economic, military and technological links with each other.[4][5][6] China is Israel's third largest trading partner globally and largest trading partner in East Asia.[7][8] Bilateral trade volume increased from $50 million in 1992 to over $10 billion in 2013.[9] Some commentators note similarities between the cultures and values of the two nations,[10] and their convergence of interests has made them natural partners.[11][8] China is one of the few countries in the world to concurrently maintain warm relations with Israel, the State of Palestine, and the Muslim world at large.[12]
China's status as a potential world power has prompted Israel to maintain close ties with the country and integrate China's global influence with Israel's economic management.[13][14][15] Israel maintains an embassy in Beijing and consulates-general in Guangzhou, Chengdu, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, while China maintains an embassy in Tel Aviv.
History
Embassy of China in Tel AvivEmbassy of Israel in Beijing
In the 1930s, David Ben-Gurion, then leader of the Yishuv in Palestine, proclaimed that China would be one of the great world powers of the future.[16] For some time after the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was diplomatically isolated, because the United States and its allies, including Israel, recognized the Republic of China (ROC, commonly known as Taiwan after 1949) as the sole legitimate government of China. The Nationalist government of the ROC had been historically sympathetic to the Zionist cause, while ROC founder Sun Yat-sen affirmed his support for the creation of a Jewish state.[17][18]
China and Israel secretly began building military ties in the 1980s during the Soviet–Afghan War, which both Israel and China opposed. They both supplied weapons to the Afghan mujahideen (Israel sending captured Palestine Liberation Organization weapons via the United States and Pakistan), and military cooperation between the two began in order to assist the Islamic resistance against the Soviets. China and Israel subsequently started exchanging visits of delegations of academics, experts, businessmen and industrialists.[21] Reportedly, a large number of the heavy tanks used in China's 1984 National Day parades were retrofitted by Israel from captured Six-Day War equipment.[22]
China eased travel restrictions, while Israel reopened its consulate in Hong Kong (then under British administration), which would serve as the main point for diplomatic and economic contact between the two nations. In 1987 Israel's Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, appointed Amos Yudan to set up the first official Government owned company (Copeco Ltd[23]) to establish and foster commercial activities between companies in China and Israel. The company was active until 1992, when official diplomatic relationships were announced between Israel and China.[21] In the early 1990s, China joined a number of nations who established ties with Israel after the initiation of a peace process between Israel and the PLO in the early 1990s; it also desired to play a role in the peace process.
In November 1991, the Israeli defense minister Moshe Arens was reported to have paid a secret visit to China and believed to have negotiated the establishment of ties and expansion of military cooperation. On January 23, 1992, the Israeli foreign minister David Levy paid a four-day visit to Beijing, preceding the formal establishment of ties.[citation needed]
Prior to the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1992, Israel and China established representative offices in Beijing and Tel Aviv, which functioned as de facto embassies. The Israeli office was formally known as the Liaison Office of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.[24] This was opened in June 1990.[25] China was similarly represented by a branch of the China International Travel Service, which also opened in 1990.[26]
Zev Sufott, who had served in the liaison office of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Beijing beginning in 1991, was appointed as Israel's first Ambassador to China upon the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.[27][28]
Relations in the 21st century
In 2009, China Radio International (CRI) began broadcasting in Hebrew.[29] In addition, the Chinese established Chinese institutes in Israel, to public and media activities of Israel-based Chinese diplomats.[30]
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited China in May 2013 and five agreements were signed during his visit. A government-to-government mechanism was established and five task forces were set up in high tech, environmental protection, energy, agriculture and financing.[9] Netanyahu visited China again in 2017 amid celebrations taking place to commemorate 25 years of ties between the two countries.[31]
During the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, it was reported that Israel was winning the public opinion battle in China with most Chinese social media users siding with Israel.[32][33]
In May 2020, the Chinese ambassador to Israel, Du Wei, was found dead at his home in Herzliya. While the exact cause of his death is unknown, it is believed he died of natural causes.[34][35]
In November 2021, Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Chinese leader, CCP general secretaryXi Jinping held the first-ever phone call between heads of state of Israel and China. According to the read-out from the Israeli President's Office, Herzog and Xi discussed opportunities to enhance Israeli-Chinese bilateral ties ahead of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, in honor of which Herzog and Xi invited each other to visit their respective countries.[36]
Military relations
Haifa base commander Brig. Gen. Eli Sharvit welcomes RADM Yang Junfei to IsraelChinese navy docks in Israel
Israel and China began military-to-military relations as early as the 1980s, even though no formal diplomatic relations existed.[37][21][38] Before diplomatic relations were established in 1992 Israel had been selling arms to China. The use of military sales as a means of achieving foreign-policy goals was neither new nor unprecedented in Israeli foreign policy to promote its interests. Israel sold technology to upgrade Chinese tanks and planes in the 1980s. IAI Lavi and unmanned aerial vehicle technology seems to have been sold to China. Expertise in fitting western equipment in Soviet made hardware helped in modernization of Chinese army and air force, this way Chinese defense modernization complemented Israel's need of cash to fund its domestic made high-tech weapons programs.[39]
The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre offered an additional incentive for military relations. Sanctions imposed by Western countries almost froze Chinese access to advanced military and dual-use technologies. Israel then sought to benefit from the situation and became China's backdoor for acquiring Western technology.[40]
Israel was ready to sell China the EL/M-2075 Phalcon, an Israeli airborne early-warning radar system (AWACS), until the United States forced it to cancel the deal.[41] Some estimate that Israel sold arms worth US$4 billion to China in this period.[37][21]
China had looked to Israel for the arms and military technology it could not acquire from the United States, Europe and Russia.[42] Israel is now China's second-largest foreign supplier of arms after Russia with China having purchased a wide array of military equipment and technology, including communications satellites.[37] China is a vital market for Israel's aerospace and defense industry.[37]
The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency compiled evidence that Israel had transferred missile, laser and aircraft technology to China in the 1990s. On 19 October 1999, the Defense Minister of China, Chi Haotian, flew to Israel and met with Ehud Barak, then-Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Israel. They reached several high-level agreements, including a $1 billion Israeli-Russian sale of military aircraft to China.[43] On 25 May 2011, the Commander of the People's Liberation Army Navy, Admiral Wu Shengli, made an official visit to Israel, meeting with Barak and Rear Admiral Eliezer Marom.[44]
On 13 August 2012, vessels from the People's Liberation Army Navy's 11th escort fleet, led by Rear Admiral Yang Jun-fei, anchored at Israel's Haifa naval base for a four-day goodwill visit to mark 20 years of cooperation between the Israel Defense Forces and the PLA.[47][48] The vessels and crewmen were welcomed by the Haifa base commander, Brigadier General Eli Sharvit,[48] and Chinese embassy officials.[47] In July 2018, 180 acres of the Northern port in Haifa were transferred to Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) for a 25-year period of management. This sparked a heated discussion in the Israeli press and the academy, as well as a special discussion by the Israeli cabinet. It also came up in discussions between US National Security Advisor John Bolton and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu when they met on January 7, 2019. However, economically insignificant it may be for both China and the US, the Haifa port could become a critical battleground in a new Cold War between the two superpowers.[49]
Economic ties
China is Israel's largest East Asian trading partner and has sought Israel's expertise in solar energy, manufacturing robotics, irrigation, construction, agricultural and water management and desalination technologies to combat drought and water shortages.[50][21][51]
Since the 2010s, China and Israel enhanced bilateral economic ties with China connecting both Chinese and Israeli businessmen and investors to invest in each other's economies respectively. Chinese economic cooperation with Israel has seen substantial Chinese investment of more than US$15 billion in the Israeli economy, spawning seed capital in Israeli startup companies, as well as the acquisition of Israeli companies by major Chinese corporations that incorporate Israel's know how to help the invigorate the development of the modern Chinese economy more efficiently. China now ranks second after the United States in collaboration with Israeli high-tech firms that are backed by Israel's Office of the Chief Scientist.[52] Major Chinese firms such as Fosun, ChemChina, Brightfood, Horizons Ventures and China Everbright have invested significant amounts of financial capital and resources across numerous Israeli industries.[53]
Investment from China in Israeli technology reached an aggregate of $15 billion from 2011 to 2017 with the surplus of Chinese investment capital finding its way through Israel's high technology sector, including agriculture, pharmaceutical, medical devices, artificial intelligence and autonomous driving.[54] With the increasing economic cooperation between the two countries, China is spearheading an increasing number of partnerships with Israeli universities such as the Tel Aviv University and Tsinghua University's $300 million joint research center, a $130 million donation to the Technion, and a program devoted entirely to teaching the Israeli business culture at Peking University.[55]
On 3 July 2011, Israel and the People's Republic of China signed an economic cooperation agreement to boost trade between the two countries. According to Eliran Elimelech, Israel's commercial attaché in Beijing, the agreement was expected to deepen ties between Israeli and Chinese businessmen in the short term, and in the medium to long term to improve trade conditions between the countries. In January 2011, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics stated that Israeli exports to China had grown by an annual 95 percent in 2010 to $2 billion.[56] In September 2011, the Israeli Minister of Transport, Israel Katz, stated that China and Israel were discussing the construction of a high-speed rail link joining the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. This joint project would permit the mass overland transport of Chinese goods to Israel and Eastern Europe, and would involve both Chinese and Israeli railway developers.[57] The following month, the Chinese and Israeli governments signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the joint construction of a 180-km (112-mile) railway linking the Israeli city of Eilat with the Negev Desert's Zin Valley, Beersheba, and Tel Aviv.[58]
In August 2012, with Chinese-Israeli trade growing, the Beijing University of International Business and Economics in Beijing set up a department dedicated to studying Israeli economics and Judaism, while some Chinese universities began offering Hebrew courses.[59] The group SIGNAL has established an exchange network of Chinese and Israeli scholars and academics to help them collaborate with each other on various academic projects.[60]
Bilateral trade between the two nations increased from $50 million to $10 billion in 2013.[8] Since 2013, Chinese investors have begun to show a growing interest in Israeli firms.[61] Recent high end deals include a Chinese donation of $130 million to Technion for a research center, Beijing winning a $2 billion tender to build the "Med-Red" railway linking Ashdod port with Eilat as well as a $1 billion Israeli port tender, a $300 million joint research center between Tel Aviv University and Tsinghua University, and Chinese acquisition of a controlling stake in Israel's Tnuva dairy company for more than US$1 billion.[12] The acquisition of Tnuva was the biggest Chinese buyout of an Israeli company since 2011 when state-owned ChemChina bought Adama, the pesticides and crop protection company then known as Makhteshim Agan, for US$2.4 billion.[62] In 2014, Chinese-Israeli tech deals totaled $300 million, up from $50 million in 2013, according to Israel's National Economic Council.[63]
Bilateral between the two countries reached in excess of $10 billion in trade since the start of 2015.[55] In January 2015, a number of Chinese information technology companies began to make investments in Israel, Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba invested an undisclosed sum in Visualead, an Israeli company specializing in QR code technology. Alibaba has also invested in Israel-based venture fund Jerusalem Venture Partners, becoming a limited partner joining Qihoo 360, another Chinese web company to have invested in the Jerusalem-based fund.[63]Baidu, China's largest search engine, has put US$3 million into Pixellot, an Israeli video capture start-up and provided funds to Carmel Ventures, an Israeli venture capital firm as well as lead a $5 million investment round in the Israeli music education firm Tonara.[62] In addition, leading Chinese technology firms such as Huawei, Legend and Xiaomi have set up R&D centers in Israel.[64]
In March 2015, Israel joined China's newly constituted Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), becoming a founding member of the institution postulating that Israel may become a major economic ally of China.[55][65]
In 2013, China and Israel began to boost the economic relations with respect to agriculture.[13] The two countries decided to set up an agriculture technology incubator in Anhui Province, China enabling joint development of agriculture technologies and solutions in keeping with requirements on the ground. Israeli agriculture trade fairs such as Agrivest and AgriTech have witnessed large Chinese delegations and greater participation from Chinese state-owned enterprises and private companies as Chinese's growing middle class and increasing consumer demand as well as increased pressure on agricultural land has prompted the East Asian giant to increasingly look at Israeli agriculture technology to boost crop yields and dairy production.[13][66]Horizons Ventures, a venture capital firm established by Hong Kong business magnate Li Ka-shing, led a US$10.8 million strategic investment in Windward, an Israeli maritime data and analytics company. MarInt, Windward's satellite maritime analytics system, is widely used by many security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies across the world.[67] In 2013, Li donated US$130 million to Technion. A large part of the money came from the profits he made from the IPO of Waze, an Israeli GPS-based map software company, in which he held an 11 percent stake that eventually acquired by Google.[68] His was the largest donation ever made to Technion and one of the biggest to any Israeli academic institution. Li has been the pioneer of Chinese investment in Israel and with his investments in Israeli high-tech, Li set the stage for Hong Kong's business elite stressing that it is financially sound and even necessary for the future of Chinese economic prosperity to invest in emerging Israeli technology companies.[55][67]
Israel and China began negotiating a free trade agreement in 2019.[69]:176 The discussions coincided with China's beginning of free trade agreement negotiations with Palestine.[69]:176 According to academic Dawn C. Murphy, China likely proceeded concurrently with both countries in order to avoid perceptions of favoritism.[69]:176
Bilateral issues and disputes
Israel's increasing defense cooperation with China has caused concern in Western nations, particularly the United States, which is the largest foreign supplier of military equipment to Israel. Owing to strategic Chinese rivalry with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, India and Vietnam, as well as concerns over the security of Taiwan, the United States has pressured Israel against selling sophisticated equipment and technology to China.[38] In 1992, The Washington Times alleged that exported American Patriot missiles and Israel's indigenous Lavi jet aircraft technology had been shared with China, although official U.S. investigations did not substantiate these charges.[70] In 2000, Israel cancelled the sale to China of the Israeli-built Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in the wake of pressure from the U.S., which threatened to cut off US$2.8 billion in yearly aid if the deal went through.[71] Israel's decision drew condemnation from China, which stated that the cancellation would hurt bilateral ties.[71] China's record of proliferating arms and weapons systems has also concerned U.S. planners, as the U.S. worries that China may repackage advanced Israeli defense technologies for resale to America's rivals and nations hostile to it throughout the world.[72]
Chinese involvement in the Israeli technology sector has also generated security concerns. The former head of Mossad, Efraim Halevy, is one of the major critics in Israel who believes that the country should examine the geopolitical considerations with China and has consistently warned the Israeli government against involving the Chinese in the Red-Med project, arguing that it could lead to a crisis in strategic relations with the United States.[73] Other critics argue that growing Chinese involvement will endanger Israeli security and lead to theft of Israeli technology to be utilized in Chinese espionage further arguing that Israel should balance its burgeoning relations with China with maintaining a balance of relations with the United States at the same time.[74][75]
In 2010, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1929, imposing a fourth round of sanctions against Iran for its nuclear enrichment program. China ultimately supported this resolution, although initially, due to the strong bilateral relations and nuclear cooperation between the China and Iran, China opposed the sanctions. According to The New York Times, Israel lobbied for the sanctions by explaining to China the impact of any pre-emptive strike on Iran would have on the world oil supply, and hence on the Chinese economy.[76]
Though relations are close and generally good with no particular bilateral problems between the two nations, China and Israel continue to remain divided on the issue of Palestine, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, economic blockade of Gaza, and the Israeli West Bank barrier wall. China has criticized Israel's construction of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. China's then Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing called the Israeli West Bank barrier wall an obstacle to peace in a September 2006 statement during a UN Security Council meeting on the Middle East. In November 2008, then China Ambassador to the United States Yesui Zhang stated that the "continued construction of settlements on the West Bank is not only in violation of Israel's obligations under international law, but is also detrimental to guaranteeing Israel's own security." According to analysis from the Jamestown Foundation, China's policy on Israel and Palestine is based on soft power diplomacy, and maintain a balancing act between its Israeli and Arab world ties.[72] On June 8, 2015, China demanded Israel to refrain from utilizing Chinese migrant construction workers in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. China sought this ban out of concern for the Chinese workers' safety in areas beyond the Green Line, which marks Israel's pre-1967 borders. The government of Israel has been eager to negotiate a deal with China completed in the hope that an influx of foreign workers will increase the rate of housing construction in Israel and reduce the costs of new homes.[78]
After the victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections in Gaza, China acknowledged Hamas as the legitimately elected political entity in the Gaza Strip despite Israeli and U.S. opposition. The Chinese government met with senior Hamas representative Mahmoud al-Zahar, who previously served as Palestinian foreign minister, during the June 2006 China-Arab Cooperation Forum in Beijing which held direct bilateral talks despite protests from Israel and the United States. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that "the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it should be respected."[72] Besides the Chinese recognition of Hamas, China also does not designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.[74]
In 2012, the families of eight Israeli terror victims of the 2008 Mercaz HaRav massacre in Jerusalem filed a $1 billion lawsuit against the Bank of China. The suit asserted that in 2003 the bank's New York branch wired millions of dollars to Hamas from its leadership in Syria and Iran. The Bank of China subsequently denied providing banking services to terrorist groups: "The Bank of China has always strictly followed the UN's anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing requirements and regulations in China and other judicial areas where we operate."[82][83] The case was dismissed in 2015.[84]
On July 23, 2014, China was among the 29 nations who voted in favor of the investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Council of war crimes committed by Israel during Operation Protective Edge, with the United States being the only nation in dissent.[85] In addition, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei earlier on 9 July 2014 issued a statement in response to the violence during the military operation, stating: "We believe that to resort to force and to counter violence with violence will not help resolve problems other than pile up more hatred. We urge relevant parties to bear in mind the broader picture of peace and the lives of the people, immediately realize a ceasefire, stick to the strategic choice of peace talks and strive for an early resumption of talks."[86] In July 2017, Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a formalization of China's positions in his "Four Points" on the "issue of Israel-Palestine conflict", the first of which was that China supported the establishment of an independent, sovereign Palestine within the framework of the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.[87]
Follow the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, an Israeli embassy official said Israel expected to see a "stronger condemnation" of Hamas and that it was "not the time to call for a two-state solution" when people were "being murdered, slaughtered in the streets."[90][91] The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs later expressed "deep disappointment" over China not condemning Hamas.[92] China does not label Hamas a terrorist group.[20] Commentary in Chinese state media blamed the U.S. for the conflict and spread antisemitic tropes against Israel.[93][94][95][96] Some netizens equated Israel's actions to Nazism by accusing them of committing genocide on Palestinians, prompting a rebuke from the German embassy in Beijing.[97] Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that in Gaza, "Israel’s actions have gone beyond self-defense."[98] In January 2024, Israel reported that it discovered a "massive" stockpile of Chinese weaponry used by Hamas.[99]
Foreign relations of Israel refers to diplomatic and trade relations between Israel and other countries around the world. Israel has diplomatic ties with 164 of the other 192 UN member states as of December 2020. Israel is a member of the United Nations (UN) and a number of other international organisations. Israel maintains full diplomatic relations with two of its Arab neighbours, Egypt and Jordan, after signing peace treaties in 1979 and 1994 respectively. In 2020, Israel signed agreements establishing diplomatic relations with three Arab League countries, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco. As of 2021, Israel had formal diplomatic relations with 168 other countries, while twenty-eight UN member states have either never established, or have broken off diplomatic relations with Israel.
Palestine, officially the State of Palestine, is a country in the southern Levant region of West Asia. It encompasses two disconnected territories — the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The country shares its borders with Israel to north, west and south, Jordan to the east and Egypt to the southwest. It has a combined land area of 6,020 square kilometres (2,320 sq mi) while its population exceeds five million people. Its proclaimed capital is Jerusalem while Ramallah serves as its administrative center and Rafah is currently its largest city. Arabic is the official language. The majority of Palestinians practice Islam while Christianity also has a significant presence.
The economy of the State of Palestine refers to the economic activity of the State of Palestine. Palestine receives substantial financial aid from international donors, including governments and international organizations. This aid is crucial for supporting the Palestinian Authority and funding public services and development projects. Palestinians working abroad send money back to their families in Palestine. These remittances provide a significant source of income for many households.
Since the 1960s, the United States has been a strong supporter of Israel. It has played a key role in the promotion of good relations between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states—notably Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt—while holding off hostility from countries such as Syria and Iran. Relations with Israel are an important factor in the U.S. government's overall foreign policy in the Middle East, and the U.S. Congress has placed considerable importance on the maintenance of a supportive relationship.
International aid has been provided to Palestinians since at least the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The Palestinians view the aid as keeping the Israeli–Palestinian peace process going, while Israelis and other foreign policy authorities have raised concerns that it is used to fund terrorism and removes the imperative for Palestinians to negotiate a settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As a provision of the Oslo Accords, international aid was to be provided to the Palestinians to ensure economic solvency for the Palestinian National Authority (PA). In 2004, it was reported that the PA, within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, receives one of the highest levels of aid in the world. In 2006, economic sanctions and other measures were taken by several countries against the PA, including suspension of international aid following Hamas' victory at the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Aid to the PA resumed in 2008 following the Annapolis Conference, where Hamas was not invited. Aid has been provided to the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs) as well as Palestinian political factions by various foreign governments, international organizations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and charities, besides other sources.
Germany–Israel relations are the diplomatic relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel. After the end of World War II and the Holocaust, relations gradually thawed as West Germany offered to pay reparations to Israel in 1952 and diplomatic relations were officially established in 1965. Nonetheless, a deep mistrust of the German people remained widespread in Israel and the Jewish diaspora communities worldwide for many years after. Relations between East Germany and Israel never materialised. Israel and Germany now maintain a "special relationship" based on shared beliefs, Western values, and a combination of historical perspectives. Among the most important factors in their relations is Nazi Germany's genocide of Jews in Europe during the Holocaust.
Since the 1990s, the Republic of India and the State of Israel have had a comprehensive economic, military, and political relationship. In 1947, India voted against the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, but nonetheless recognized Israeli sovereignty in 1950. Israel opened a consulate in Bombay in 1953. Collaboration gradually increased as Israel became a key Indian ally amidst the India–Pakistan conflict; Israel supplied India with armaments, ammunition, and intelligence during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1999. Full diplomatic relations were established in 1992, when India opened an embassy in Tel Aviv and Israel opened an embassy in New Delhi. Both countries are members of the I2U2 Group, formed in October 2021, and have stated that they have a strong bilateral relationship, sharing similarities in spirit and facing common challenges, increasingly cooperating in the industrial and technological sectors.
The State of Israel and the Republic of Turkey formally established diplomatic relations in March 1949. Less than a year after the Israeli Declaration of Independence, Turkey recognized Israeli sovereignty, making it the world's first Muslim-majority country to do so. Both countries gave high priority to bilateral cooperation in the areas of diplomacy and military/strategic ties, while sharing concerns with respect to the regional instabilities in the Middle East. In recent decades, particularly under Turkey's Erdoğan administration, the two countries' relationship with each other has deteriorated considerably. However, diplomatic ties were reinstated after a successful normalization initiative in mid-2022.
Colombia–Israel relations are the diplomatic relations between Colombia and Israel which were officially established in the mid-1950s, however, diplomatic relations were severed in 2024 by Colombia as a result of the Israel–Hamas war.
Israel–United Kingdom relations, or Anglo-Israeli relations, are the diplomatic and commercial ties between the United Kingdom and Israel. The British embassy to Israel is located in Tel Aviv. The UK has an honorary consul in Eilat and a non-accredited consulate-general in Jerusalem, that represents the United Kingdom in that city and the Palestinian territories. Israel has three representative offices in the United Kingdom: an Embassy located in London and consulates in Cardiff and Glasgow.
Israel–Thailand relations refers to diplomatic and cultural ties between the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Thailand. The countries have had official relations since June 1954. The Israeli embassy in Bangkok was established in 1958. Since 1996, Thailand has had an embassy in Tel Aviv. Thailand and Israel share a close and friendly relationship, and cooperate on many fields. People-to-people relations between the two countries are also good, as thousands of Thais are employed in Israel, and millions of Israelis have visited and continue to visit Thailand.
Israel–Singapore relations, also referred to as Israeli–Singaporean relations, refers to the bilateral relations between the State of Israel and the Republic of Singapore. Relations between the two countries have been extremely cordial and friendly for more than half a century, which are influenced by their similar geopolitical state of affairs, being relatively small states surrounded by larger neighbors hostile to their continued existence.
Israel–Jordan relations are the diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between Israel and Jordan. The two countries share a land border, with three border crossings: Yitzhak Rabin/Wadi Araba Crossing, Jordan River Crossing and the Allenby/King Hussein Bridge Crossing, that connects the West Bank with Jordan. The relationship between the two countries is regulated by the Israel–Jordan peace treaty in 1994, which formally ended the state of war that had existed between the two countries since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and also established diplomatic relations, besides other matters. Relations between the countries get strained from time to time, usually over tensions at the Al-Aqsa mosque. On 8 October 2020, Israel and Jordan reached an agreement to allow flights to cross over both countries’ airspace.
Brazil–Israel relations are the bilateral relations between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the State of Israel. Brazil has an embassy in Tel Aviv and an honorary consulate in Haifa. Israel has an embassy in Brasília and a consulate-general in São Paulo. The Brazilian ambassador to Israel is Gerson Menandro Garcia de Freitas. Israel's current ambassador to Brazil is Daniel Zohar Zonshine. Brazil and Israel maintain close political and military ties. The two nations enjoy a degree of arms cooperation. Brazil is a full member state of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, while several Brazilian elected officials participate in the Israel Allies Caucus, a political advocacy organization that mobilizes pro-Israel parliamentarians in governments worldwide.
Israel and Indonesia have no formal diplomatic ties, although they maintain quiet trade, tourism and security contacts. In 2012, Indonesia spoke of upgrading relations with Israel and opening a consulate in Ramallah, but this agreement was never implemented.
China–Palestine relations, also referred to as Sino–Palestinian relations, encompass the long bilateral relationship between China and Palestine dating back from the early years of the Cold War.
Relations between Indonesia and Palestine have been very close and friendly. Indonesia has refused to recognize the State of Israel until a peace agreement is reached between Israel and the State of Palestine. Indonesia has strongly stood up for the rights and freedoms of the Palestinians and has supported the struggles of the Palestinians.
Bangladesh and Israel do not have diplomatic relations. Bangladesh has stated that it will not recognize Israel until there is an independent Palestinian state. Some reports have alleged that Bangladesh and Israel maintain some trade relations indirectly and sometimes secretly, although the Bangladesh government denies these allegations.
Israel–Palestine relations refers to the political, security, economical and other relations between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine. Israel and the PLO began to engage in the late 1980s and early 1990s in what became the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, culminated with the Oslo Accords in 1993. Shortly after, the Palestinian National Authority was established and during the next 6 years formed a network of economic and security connections with Israel, being referred to as a fully autonomous region with self-administration. In the year 2000, the relations severely deteriorated with the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada – a rapid escalation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The events calmed down in 2005, with reconciliation and cease fire. The situation became more complicated with the split of the Palestinian Authority in 2007, the violent split of Fatah and Hamas factions, and Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip. The Hamas takeover resulted in a complete rift between Israel and the Palestinian faction in the Gaza Strip, cancelling all relations except limited humanitarian supply.
Jordan–Palestine relations are strong, historical, bilateral relations.
↑ Horovitz, David (11 December 2012). "Israel's China challenge". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 8 July 2023. Retrieved 31 July 2023.
↑ "外交部:中方严重关切以色列对加沙发动军事行动". China Daily (in Chinese). China. 16 November 2012. Archived from the original on 13 December 2019. Retrieved 16 November 2012.
↑ McCartney, Micah (2023-10-11). "China's state media accused of spreading anti-Israel disinformation". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 2023-10-11. Retrieved 2023-10-11. Anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric has become prevalent on China's insular social media in recent years, in part because of Israel's close association with the U.S. and the West.
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