Anti-access/area denial

Last updated
An S-400 surface-to-air missile system can be used as an A2/AD asset. S-400 Triumf-34.jpg
An S-400 surface-to-air missile system can be used as an A2/AD asset.

Anti-Access/Area Denial (or A2/AD) is a military strategy to control access to and within an operating environment. [2] In an early definition, anti-access refers to those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. Area denial refers to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing force's freedom of action within the operational area. [3] [4] In short, A2 affects movement to a theater, while AD affects movement within a theater. [5] A2/AD typically refers to a strategy used by a weaker opponent to defend against an opponent of superior skill, [6] although a stronger opponent can also use A2/AD.

Contents

Overview

United States

A2/AD strategy is a significant concern of US policy, viewing it as a weapon of weaker forces that could be used against the US military. [2] The US military considers that enemy adoption of anti-access/area denial strategies "may well be the most difficult operational challenge U.S. forces will face over the coming decades." [4] The Department of Defense developed the "joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities". [7]

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson has commented on the vagueness of the term A2/AD, saying: "To some, A2AD is a code-word, suggesting an impenetrable “keep-out zone” that forces can enter only at extreme peril to themselves. To others, A2AD refers to a family of technologies. To still others, a strategy. In sum, A2AD is a term bandied about freely, with no precise definition, that sends a variety of vague or conflicting signals, depending on the context in which it is either transmitted or received. [...] The Navy will avoid using the term A2AD as a stand-alone acronym that can mean many things to different people or almost anything to anyone." [8]

China

The People's Republic of China is employing a multi-faceted A2/AD strategy to exclude or deter as many adversary forces from acting within the waters it claims as its territorial waters as outlined by the nine-dash line. The initial impulse for this strategy is said to have been the deployment of two US carrier battle groups in the area, reacting to Chinese tests and exercises for a possible invasion of Taiwan in 1995, which went effectively uncontested by the Chinese navy. [9] The Chinese A2/AD strategy's main focus lies on sea denial by missiles (see also paragraph Sea), but features submarines and airplanes as well. [10] The Chinese denial capabilities are not sufficient to exclude Japanese and US troops from the South China Sea, but enough to inflict heavy casualties in case of a war for the occupation of Taiwan. [10]

Sea

The KD-88 anti-ship missile is part of China's A2/AD weaponry. YJ-83J Missile 20170902.jpg
The KD-88 anti-ship missile is part of China's A2/AD weaponry.

The concept of A2/AD has long been used by navies under names such as Command of the seas [6] and controlling the sea lines of communication. Naval A2/AD typically takes advantage of geographical features that limit access such as chokepoints or the water surrounding an island. A blockade is an example of a naval anti-access operation. [2]

Anti-ship missiles are a modern method of stopping a potential adversary from attacking by sea. China, Russia, North Korea, Syria and Iran all have developed or imported such weapons in an effort to develop a modern A2/AD strategy to counter United States' power projection from nearby waterways. [12] In response to China's pursuit of such A2/AD capabilities, the United States has developed the AirSea Battle doctrine. Other methods of area denial at a strategic level include aircraft carriers, submarines, surface-to-air missiles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, electronic warfare and interceptor aircraft. [13] [14] Mines, coastal submarines, and attack craft could be employed in littoral areas. [3] Other area denial systems include cruise missiles, long-range strike aircraft, mines, and coastal defense artillery. [3] The term A2/AD was created in 2003 to describe the threats posed by long-range missile systems, precision munitions, and satellite technology that will make military operations in the littoral areas challenging for modern naval forces. [2]

Land

The anti-access threat for the Army includes "theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long-range rockets and artillery, weapons of mass destruction and other unconventional means, and information operations." [15] A2/AD strategies on land often take advantage of natural geographic features or bridges that can support anti-access operations. [2] Land-based area denial operations degrade the adversary's ability with techniques such as harassing fires, deception, and guerrilla-warfare-like tactics that avoid direct confrontation. [2] Land-based area denial techniques also include artillery, rocket, and missile strikes, mine fields, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. [3]

Air

A no-fly zone is an A2/AD strategy in the air, prohibiting access to part of the airspace. [2] A2/AD can be supported by surface-to-air missiles such as the S-300 and S-400. [3] The threat on forward air bases from cruise and ballistic missiles can also impose anti-access. [3]

Cyberspace

Attacks in cyberspace are an increasingly important part of the A2/AD threat. [2] Tactical cyber A2/AD operations block access to specific resources, while strategic A2/AD blocks access to cyberspace itself. [2]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Anti-ballistic missile</span> Surface-to-air missile designed to counter ballistic missiles

An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a surface-to-air missile designed to counter ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles are used to deliver nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional warheads in a ballistic flight trajectory. The term "anti-ballistic missile" is a generic term conveying a system designed to intercept and destroy any type of ballistic threat; however, it is commonly used for systems specifically designed to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cruise missile</span> Guided missile with precision targeting capabilities and multiple launch platforms

A cruise missile is a guided missile used against terrestrial or naval targets, that remains in the atmosphere and flies the major portion of its flight path at an approximately constant speed. Cruise missiles are designed to deliver a large warhead over long distances with high precision. Modern cruise missiles are capable of traveling at high subsonic, supersonic, or hypersonic speeds, are self-navigating, and are able to fly on a non-ballistic, extremely low-altitude trajectory.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Missile</span> Self-propelled guided weapon system

A missile is an airborne ranged weapon capable of self-propelled flight aided usually by a propellant, jet engine or rocket motor.

The United States Armed Forces are the military forces of the United States. The armed forces consist of six service branches: the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and Coast Guard. All six armed services are among the eight uniformed services of the United States.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Aerial warfare</span> Military combat involving aircraft

Aerial warfare is the use of military aircraft and other flying machines in warfare. Aerial warfare includes bombers attacking enemy installations or a concentration of enemy troops or strategic targets; fighter aircraft battling for control of airspace; attack aircraft engaging in close air support against ground targets; naval aviation flying against sea and nearby land targets; gliders, helicopters and other aircraft to carry airborne forces such as paratroopers; aerial refueling tankers to extend operation time or range; and military transport aircraft to move cargo and personnel.

Sea denial is a military term for preventing an enemy from using the sea. It does not necessarily imply that the denier can itself use the sea. It is a parallel concept to sea control, which implies that that controlling force cannot be successfully attacked.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States Strategic Command</span> Unified combatant command based in Nebraska

The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is one of the eleven unified combatant commands in the United States Department of Defense. Headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, USSTRATCOM is responsible for strategic nuclear deterrence, global strike, and operating the Defense Department's Global Information Grid. It also provides a host of capabilities to support the other combatant commands, including integrated missile defense; and global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). This command exists to give "national leadership a unified resource for greater understanding of specific threats around the world and the means to respond to those threats rapidly".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear weapons delivery</span> Type of explosive arms

Nuclear weapons delivery is the technology and systems used to place a nuclear weapon at the position of detonation, on or near its target. Several methods have been developed to carry out this task.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air and Space Force is the strategic missile, air, and space force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran. It was renamed from the IRGC Air Force into the IRGC Aerospace Force in 2009.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear triad</span> Set of three types of nuclear-strike weapons

A nuclear triad is a three-pronged military force structure of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers with nuclear bombs and missiles. Countries build nuclear triads to eliminate an enemy's ability to destroy a nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack, which preserves their own ability to launch a second strike and therefore increases their nuclear deterrence.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">DF-21</span> MRBM/IRBM

The Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21; NATO reporting name CSS-5 - Dong-Feng is a two-stage, solid-fuel rocket, single-warhead medium-range ballistic missile in the Dong Feng series developed by China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy. Development started in the late 1960s and was completed around 1985–86, but it was not deployed until 1991. It was developed from the submarine-launched JL-1 missile, and is China's first solid-fuel land-based missile. The U.S. Department of Defense in 2008 estimated that China had 60-80 missiles and 60 launchers; approximately 10-11 missiles can be built annually.

The national security of China is the coordination of a variety of organizations, including law enforcement, military, paramilitary, governmental, and intelligence agencies that aim to ensure China's national security. China considers three factors in its national security: national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

An anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) is a military ballistic missile system designed to hit a warship at sea.

AirSea Battle is an integrated battle doctrine that forms a key component of the military strategy of the United States. The doctrine became official in February 2010, and was renamed to Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) in 2015.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Missile defense systems by country</span> Introduction of protective military equipments

Missile defense systems are a type of missile defense intended to shield a country against incoming missiles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or other ballistic missiles. The United States, Russia, India, France, Israel, Italy, United Kingdom, China and Iran have all developed missile defense systems.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Offset strategy</span>

An offset is some means of asymmetrically compensating for a disadvantage, particularly in a military competition. Rather than match an opponent in an unfavorable competition, changing the competition to more favorable footing enables the application of strengths to a problem that is otherwise either unwinnable or winnable only at unacceptable cost. An offset strategy consequently seeks to deliberately change an unattractive competition to one more advantageous for the implementer. In this way, an offset strategy is a type of competitive strategy that seeks to maintain advantage over potential adversaries over long periods of time while preserving peace where possible.

Iran's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Strait of Hormuz mixes advanced technology with guerilla tactics to deny, deter or delay foreign forces access and maritime freedom of maneuver. The regular attempt by adversaries to deny one another freedom of movement on the battlefield can be observed throughout history. What makes anti-access/area-denial nowadays different from the past is the rapid improvement in military and communication technology in recent decades and new ways of implementing these strategies that such technology creates. Most scholarly attention seems to have gone to Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, most likely because modern military technology is required to uphold A2/AD, it is almost always exclusively practiced by advanced regional powers like China. The A2/AD portfolio leverages diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) activities. The focus of the Iranian A2/AD threat in the Strait of Hormuz is limited to the military dimension.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">History of the United States Space Force</span> History of American military development

While the United States Space Force gained its independence on 20 December 2019, the history of the United States Space Force can be traced back to the beginnings of the military space program following the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945. Early military space development was begun within the United States Army Air Forces by General Henry H. Arnold, who identified space as a crucial military arena decades before the first spaceflight. Gaining its independence from the Army on 18 September 1947, the United States Air Force began development of military space and ballistic missile programs, while also competing with the United States Army and United States Navy for the space mission.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Agni-P</span> Indian-designed medium-range ballistic missile

Agni-P or Agni-Prime is a medium-range ballistic missile being developed by India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) as a successor for Agni-I and Agni-II missiles in the operational service of Strategic Forces Command with significant upgrades in the form of composite motor casing, maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) along with improved propellants, navigation and guidance systems.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rapid Dragon (missile system)</span> Palletized airdrop missile deployment system

Rapid Dragon is a palletized and disposable weapons module which is airdropped in order to deploy flying munitions, typically cruise missiles, from unmodified cargo planes. Developed by the United States Air Force and Lockheed, the airdrop-rigged pallets, called "deployment boxes," provide a low cost method allowing unmodified cargo planes, such as C-130 or C-17 aircraft, to be temporarily repurposed as standoff bombers capable of mass launching any variant of long or short range AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles against land or naval targets.

References

  1. ↑ Giles, Keir; Boulegue, Mathieu (2019). "Russia's A2/AD Capabilities: Real and Imagined". The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters. 49 (1): 21–36. doi: 10.55540/0031-1723.2860 . S2CID   232333797.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Russell, Alison Lawlor (2017). "Historical Perspective of A2/AD Strategy". Strategic A2/AD in Cyberspace: 11–25. doi:10.1017/9781316817001.002. ISBN   9781316817001.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Krepinevich, Andrew; Watts, Barry; Work, Robert (2003). Meeting the anti-access and area denial challenge (PDF). Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Washington, DC.
  4. 1 2 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) (PDF). Department of Defense. 17 January 2012.
  5. ↑ Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 17 February 2011. p. 522.
  6. 1 2 Tangredi, Sam (2013). Anti-access warfare: countering anti-access and area-denial strategies. ISBN   978-1-61251-187-0.
  7. ↑ U.S. Department of Defense (February 2010). Quadrennial Defense Review Report (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 23 September 2015. Retrieved 3 October 2012.
  8. ↑ Richardson, Adm. John (October 3, 2016). "Deconstructing A2AD". The National Interest.
  9. ↑ Lake, Jon (2023-03-14). "China's Stealthy Area Denial". Asian Military Review. Retrieved 2024-02-27.
  10. 1 2 Romero Meraner, Fabian-Lucas (2023-02-09). "China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial Strategy". The Defence Horizon Journal. Retrieved 2024-02-27.
  11. ↑ Yevtodyeva, M. G. (2022). "Development of the Chinese A2/AD System in the Context of US–China Relations". Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 92 (Suppl 6): S534–S542. doi: 10.1134/S1019331622120048 . S2CID   252600538.
  12. ↑ Kazianis, Harry. "Anti-Access Goes Global". The Diplomat. Retrieved 2011-12-29.
  13. ↑ Ben, Ho Wan Beng (15 November 2018). "Are Aircraft Carriers Still Relevant?". The Diplomat. James Pach. Retrieved 14 January 2019.
  14. ↑ Freier, Nathan (17 May 2012). "The Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenge". Center for Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved 14 January 2018.
  15. ↑ Concepts for the Objective Force. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff (Army-HQ). 2001-11-01.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.