Mentophobia

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Mentophobia or mentaphobia is a concept described by Donald Griffin, an American zoologist and the founder of cognitive ethology, to denote strong resistance from scientists to the idea that animals, other than humans, are conscious. [1] [2] Griffin argued that there is a taboo "against scientific consideration of private, conscious, mental experiences" that leads to the minimization of the significance of the consciousness of non-human animals, as well as human consciousness and asserted that this presents a significant barrier to scientific progress. [3]

Mentophobia has been likened to Frans de Waal's concept of anthropodenial: [1] "a blindness to the humanlike characteristics of other animals, or the animal-like characteristics of ourselves". [4] It has also been compared with an observation by Daniel Dennett that "a curious asymmetry can be observed" when it comes to the certainty of human consciousness not being required for moral certainty, but moral certainty is not applied when it comes to the experiences of other animals. [5]

David Chauvet in Contre la Mentaphobie ("Against Mentaphobia"), argues that the denial of the consciousness of animals alleviates the guilt that is associated with abuses directed towards them. [6]

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Donald Redfield Griffin was an American professor of zoology at various universities who conducted seminal research in animal behavior, animal navigation, acoustic orientation and sensory biophysics. In 1938, while an undergraduate at Harvard University, he began studying the navigational method of bats, which he identified as animal echolocation in 1944. In The Question of Animal Awareness (1976), he argued that animals are conscious like humans. Griffin was the originator of the concept of mentophobia: the denial of the consciousness of other animals by scientists.

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References

  1. 1 2 Sueur, Cédric; Forin-Wiart, Marie-Amélie; Pelé, Marie (December 2020). "Are They Really Trying to Save Their Buddy? The Anthropomorphism of Animal Epimeletic Behaviours". Animals. 10 (12): 2323. doi: 10.3390/ani10122323 . PMC   7762333 . PMID   33297457.
  2. Ricard, Matthieu (2016). A Plea for the Animals: The Moral, Philosophical, and Evolutionary Imperative to Treat All Beings with Compassion (First English ed.). Boulder: Shambhala. p. 132. ISBN   978-0-8348-4054-6. OCLC   960042213.
  3. Griffin, Donald R. (1998-07-10). "From cognition to consciousness". Animal Cognition. 1 (1): 3–16. doi:10.1007/s100710050002. ISSN   1435-9448. S2CID   35714482.
  4. Waal, Frans de (January 19, 1997). "Are We in Anthropodenial?". Discover Magazine. Retrieved 2021-01-17.
  5. Waldau, Paul (2013). Animal Studies: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 122. ISBN   978-0-19-996839-8. OCLC   839301846.
  6. Chauvet, David (2014). Contre la Mentaphobie [Against Mentaphobia]. Lausanne (Suisse): L'Age d'homme. ISBN   978-2-8251-4367-4. OCLC   881573845.

Further reading