| Battle of Preveza | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Third Ottoman–Venetian War | |||||||
| Battle of Preveza, Ohannes Umed Behzad | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Holy League | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 122 galleys and galliots 366 cannon 3,000 janissaries and 8,000 soldiers [1] [2] | 112 galleys 50 galiots 2,500–2,594 cannon 60,000 soldiers [1] 140 carracks and galleons [3] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Several ships damaged 400 killed 800 wounded [1] [4] | Two galleys and five carracks sunk or captured (Spanish and Italian sources) [5] [6] [1] 128 ships sunk or captured (Turkish sources) [7] 13 ships sunk and 36 captured (English sources) [4] 3,000 prisoners [1] [4] | ||||||
The Battle of Preveza (also known as Prevesa) was a naval engagement that occurred on 28 September 1538 near Preveza in the Ionian Sea in northwest Greece, in the same area as the Battle of Actium in 31 BC. [8] The battle was between an Ottoman fleet and a Holy League fleet and ended as an Ottoman victory. It was amongst the three largest battles in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century, alongside the Battle of Djerba and the Battle of Lepanto. [9] [10]
In 1537, commanding a large Ottoman fleet, Hayreddin Barbarossa captured several Aegean and Ionian islands belonging to the Republic of Venice, namely Syros, Aegina, Ios, Paros, Tinos, Karpathos, Kasos, and Naxos, thus annexing the Duchy of Naxos. He unsuccessfully besieged Corfu, which belonged to the Republic of Venice, and ravaged the Spanish-held Calabrian coast. [11]
In February 1538, Pope Paul III assembled a Holy League, comprising the Papal States, Habsburg Spain, the Republic of Genoa, the Republic of Venice, and the Knights of Malta, to confront Barbarossa's fleet. [12] Andrea Doria, the Genoese admiral in service to Emperor Charles V, was in command. The Papal fleet under Admiral Marco Grimani and the Venetian fleet under Vincenzo Cappello arrived first. Doria joined them with the Spanish-Genoese fleet on 22 September 1538.
Before Doria arrived, Grimani attempted to land troops near the Fortress of Preveza but suffered significant casualties in an encounter with Ottoman forces under Murat Reis, causing a retreat to Corfu, where the Holy League assembled its fleet. Barbarossa was at Kos in the Aegean Sea at that time, but soon arrived at Preveza with the rest of the Ottoman fleet after capturing Kefalonia. Sinan Reis, an Ottoman lieutenant, suggested landing troops at Actium on the Gulf of Arta, near Preveza. Barbarossa initially opposed this idea, though it later provedd important in securing Ottoman victory.
On September 25, after having located Barbarossa, Doria stationed his armada in front of the mouth of the gulf, where the two fleets observed each other in a stalemate. [13] Barbarossa could not leave, as he would have been overwhelmed, and the surrounding land was under Ottoman control, so his armada could wait safely. Doria would have won in a direct battle, but he could not assault the gulf as its mouth acted as a bottleneck for his ships. Furthermore, he was unable to manoeuvre his sailing ships, whose artillery he relied on, as strong winds threatened to drive the ships onto the hostile coast if they approached further. [13]
The Holy League were forced to disembark their landing forces and eliminate the Ottoman artillery before installing their own and turning the gulf against the Ottomans. A plan involving the Spanish Marine Infantry was considered and rejected due to Grimani's previous failure and because explorers could not find anywhere to safely disembark. [14] The Ottomans attempted to build additional fortifications but were prevented by the artillery fire from the coast. This was the only exchange that day as both sides did not want to risk making a mistake. [13]
During the night of September 27, Doria ordered his fleet to sail 30 miles south towards Sessola, near Leucade, and raid Lepanto and nearby Turkish positions to force Barbarossa to come out. [15] Barbarossa quickly ordered his fleet into a Y-shaped formation, with himself in the center, alongside Sinan Reis, Cafer Reis, Şaban Reis and his son Hasan Reis. Seydi Ali Reis commanded the left wing and Salih Reis commanded the right wing. Turgut Reis, accompanied by Murat Reis, Güzelce Mehmet Reis and Sadık Reis, commanded the rear wing with six large galliots.
Christian sources provide mutually incompatible accounts on the movements and intentions of Doria, Grimani and Cappello during the battle. Venetian sources, the mainstream version, portray Doria as causing defeat through inaction, while Hispano-Genoese accounts blame Grimani and Cappello for refusing to follow Doria's battle plan. [14]
Venetian accounts state that Doria believed Barbarossa was too close to the Ottoman-controlled shore, so he did not order an attack. Cappello and Grimani disagreed with Doria and pushed for an attack. After three hours of discussion, Doria relented, ordering the galleys to turn north, where they would reunite with sailing ships. Weather disrupted his strategy, as a lack of wind caused the sailing ships to lag behind, giving Barbarossa an opportunity to attack them without leaving the Ottoman shore. The captains called for immediate help to ships, which were being attacked by the more mobile Ottoman galleys. [16]
Doria headed with the Christian galleys towards Barbarossa, trying to trap the Ottomans between them and the sailing ships. However, upon reaching the battle, he turned away, believing Barbarossa was still too close to the coast, and hoping to act as bait for Barbarossa to turn towards. Cappello, having recognised this, did not push Barbarossa further. [17] Cappello and Grimani grew weary from tactical manoeuvring, so they pushed for Doria to fight, even boarding his flagship. [18] [15] Doria refused, unsuccessfully faking an attack twice before the night fell. He ordered all Christian vessels to escape the next morning. [18]
Imperial sources state that Doria ordered the fleet to be ready after seeing Barbarossa leaving Arta. He sent a messenger on a brigantine to call Grimani and Cappello, communicating his intent to attack and asking if they were ready, which they both confirmed. Grimani thought it was risky to frontally engage Barbarossa, but was willing to do so. Doria ordered the sailing ships to head to the Ottoman left wing, intending to cut them from the coast, while the Venetian and Papal galleys followed them closer to the coast, enveloping any Ottomans who attempted to do the same to the sailing ships. Despite Doria ordering the Christian galleys thrice, they did not move. [19]
As the Ottoman galleys had surrounded the sailing ships, the Doria dispatched the Spanish Viceroy of Sicily, Ferrante Gonzaga, in another brigantine to urge Cappello and Grimani to follow his strategy. The allied captains replied evasively. [20] Grimani changed his mind and claimed he lacked superior orders from the Republic of Venice to engage in direct combat. [19] Doria was only followed by nine allied galleys. He sailed around the formation, calling the rest to regroup, but many became entangled in the attempt, which would have made them easy prey had the sailing ships not been between them and Barbarossa. Doria ordered a retreat at nightfall. [20]
Regardless of the cause, the sailing ships were under attack. The huge Venetian flagship Candia or Galeone di Venezia, captained by Alessandro Condalmiero, was left stranded 4 miles off the coast and 10 miles off Sessola. Condalmiero was surrounded by dozens of Ottoman galleys; he initially fended them off with heavy artillery, but Barbarossa's ships managed to position themselves on the ship's blind spots and attack. Condalmiero attempted to turn around to prevent this. The ship fought fiercely, waiting for galleys that did not arrive, ending up damaged, but not captured, even after Barbarossa's flagship joined the fray. [16]
The Spanish and Genoese sailing ships fought back through sheer firepower. The two main flagships, captained by Francisco Sarmiento and Juan Villegas de Figueroa, defended against multiple Ottoman attacks. Figueroa's ship was eventually overwhelmed, forcing his marine infantry to fight in a last stand until the vessel sank. Another ship, captained by Machín de Munguía with marine company, faced ozens of Turkish galleys, becoming dismasted and severely damaged, although ultimately escaping unboarded. [21] Several ships fired towards the attackers, while others lost hope of aid and abandoned the ships. [16]
Christian sources state that the Christians had lost two galleys and five ships by the end of the day, [5] [1] while Turkish sources state that the Ottomans had sunk, destroyed or captured 128 ships, taking approximately 3,000 prisoners. [7] Others sources state that there were 13 destroyed ships, 36 captured and 3,000 prisoners. [4] The Ottomans kept all of their ships, but 400 died and 800 were wounded.
There was large dissent within the Holy League due to their actions in battle. Due to prior hostility between Venice and Genoa, Cappello accused Doria of sabotaging the battle to not risk Hispano-Genoese ships, saving them for future operations outside the League, while leaving the ships of Venice to be destroyed. [22] Chroniclers focused on Doria's inexplicable decision to not attack despite his superior fleet. [23] Sephardic scholar Joseph ha-Kohen proposed that God confounded Doria's mind to punish him for mistreating Jewish prisoners in his campaigns. [24]
Doria insisted for the Holy League to continue the campaign and capture the fortress of Castelnuovo, present day Herceg Novi, Montenegro, to form a beachhead for an invasion of the Ottoman Balkans. Spaniards and Venetians fought over who would garrison Castelnuovo. To ease tensions, Charles V offered Venice permanent control over the fortress, but was rejected, as the Venetians claimed to lack the means to defend it. Venice had already started negotiations with the Ottomans. [25] Barbarossa launched an expedition to recover the fortress the following year, leading to the Siege of Castelnuovo. He captured almost all of the remaining Christian outposts in the Ionian and Aegean Seas.
In October 1540, a peace treaty was signed between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, under which the Ottomans gained control of the Venetian possessions in the Peloponnese and Dalmatia and the former Venetian islands in the Aegean, Ionian and Eastern Mediterranean sea. Venice paid a war compensation of 300,000 ducats in gold to the Ottoman Empire.
With the victory at Preveza and the subsequent victory at the Battle of Djerba in 1560, the Ottomans repelled the efforts of Venice and Spain, their main rival powers in the Mediterranean. Ottoman superiority in similar battles remained unchallenged until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. [26]