Dual containment

Last updated

Dual containment was an official US foreign policy aimed at containing Ba'athist Iraq and Revolutionary Iran. The term was first officially used in May 1993 by Martin Indyk at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and officially announced on February 24, 1994 at a symposium of the Middle East Policy Council by Indyk, who was the senior director for Middle East Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC). [1] [2]

Contents

It represented a continuation of US foreign policy toward Iran and Iraq during the Cold War and Bill Clinton's attempt to revise a Persian Gulf strategy after the Gulf War.

Rationale

The United States had a longstanding strategic doctrine in the Middle East not to let any country become so powerful that it could control the entire Gulf Region's oil supply. For that reason, the US looked to both Saudi Arabia and Iran, under the Shah, as "twin pillars" of regional security. [3] (See offshore balancing.)

Clinton wanted to make the Israeli–Palestinian peace process a major priority in his foreign policy and so he wanted to ensure Iraq and Iran would not be in a position to interfere with that agenda. [4] Iraq was already under containment by the US and its allies in the form of the Iraqi no-fly zones. Iran had been cut off from the US ever since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Although Clinton held out hope for eventual changes in regime policy from those countries, containment seemed to be the only viable option for the near future. [5]

Although the US had planned in the 1980s to balance Iraq and Iran against each other directly, that had become untenable and unnecessary by the early 1990s. Both countries had been exhausted militarily and financially from the Iran–Iraq War. Also, the Soviet Union was no longer around to be a security benefactor for either country. [6]

Clinton tasked his national security advisor, Tony Lake, with crafting a new strategy.

Policy vision and implementation

Iraq

The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored exploring dialogue with Saddam, but US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the CIA, and the US State Department wanted a harder line. The State Department, however, was concerned about the possibility of a sectarian war if Saddam was overthrown. It settled on an approach that was called "aggressive containment," a strategy of containment "through sanctions and the occasional resort to force." [7]

Lake rejected giving the CIA immediate authority to begin exploring options of a potential officer-led coup against Saddam. However, it was agreed that the administration would give political to support to the Iraqi National Congress and would continue the no-fly zones protecting Kurdish and Shia populations in Iraq. [8]

Clinton authorized the use of punitive military force against Saddam's regime as part of this strategy, such as in 1993, when it was discovered that the Iraqi leader had plotted to assassinate George H. W. Bush, [9] and in 1998 when Saddam expelled United Nations weapons inspectors. [10]

Iran

Clinton's team saw Iran as a "rogue state" that was fundamentally opposed to American interests in the Middle East. [11]

Overthrow was not a viable policy option because of the lack of organized opposition or American intelligence assets on the ground. Positive inducement to behavioral changes was also dismissed because of the Iranian regime's deep distrust of the US. Finally, punitive military action was ruled out on the grounds that Iran's retaliatory capabilities were considered too great, and the benefits of the strikes were too uncertain. Thus, it was decided to continue American efforts to prevent Iran's acquisition of ballistic missiles and access to international finance.

That approach, known as "active containment," was designed to convince the Iranian elite to pursue rapprochement with the West over time. [12]

On May 6, 1995, Clinton signed an executive order to bolster the Iranian containment. It banned arms sales to Iran, such as dual-use technologies, and imports of Iranian goods. It also established a diplomatic position of blocking Iran from all international lending.[ citation needed ] [13]

Reception

According to Indyk, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia tried to show support for the policy by promising to buy dozens of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas civilian airliners in mid-1993 to ensure that US industries could count on financial support from Saudi Arabia even without the opportunities that would have been afforded them with a rapprochement with Iran. [14]

However, the United Arab Emirates by the late 1990s told US officials that they thought that Saddam was meeting his international obligations and that containment of Iraq was no longer necessary. [15] The policy became increasingly unpopular internationally, and the sanctions had weakened significantly by 2000. [16]

Daniel Pipes supported the policy in a testimony to the US Congress in March 1995 and gave praise for its strategy and policy but criticized the tactics of its implementation. He said that US policy should not be forced to engage Iran or Iraq unless either acted responsibly. [17]

Articles in Foreign Affairs [18] and for the Cato Institute [19] in 1994 criticized dual containment as "shot through with logical flaws and practical inconsistencies and is based on faulty geopolitical premises" and one that required "a prolonged U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region."

Resemblance to Kennan's containment of Soviet Union

The idea was inspired by George F. Kennan's ideas of containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but critics have argued [1] that it did not respect Kennan's key demand for containment to succeed: the principle of power-balancing.

According to Kennan, the United States and the Soviet Union should respect the other's spheres of interest. That way the two could get along, build themselves up, and develop their societies. However, they must under no circumstances go to war with each other. To be sure, with two diametrically opposed systems, relations would never be warm, or even co-operative. However, as long as neither tried to destroy each other, catastrophe could be avoided.

What Kennan was expressing was the concept of balancing, the idea that in the world of international politics, a proper balance could be struck between potential adversaries, which would produce a stable situation that could be prolonged indefinitely.

In the case of Iraq and Iran in the 1990s, US policymakers confronted them with what amounted to a diktat since both had to remake themselves according to US desires, or the US would simply keep up the sanctions until they did.

Consequences

As a consequence of the policy, the U.S. had to station large number of troops nearby. Troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia, an area that many in the region regard as "holy soil," which offended many locals and is cited by Osama bin Laden as one reason for his hatred against the United States policies and part of his motivation for the September 11 attacks.

Traditional American policies had been not to engage with troops on the ground in the Middle East, but to stay "over the horizon", ready to move in at short notice. The only time the U.S. had deviated from this policy was during its intervention in the civil war in Lebanon, and that led to the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing.

By the mid-1990s there was considerable dissatisfaction with dual containment, because it made the United States the mortal enemy of two countries that hated each other, and forced Washington to bear the burden of containing both. Pressed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and other pro-Israel forces, [20] Clinton toughened up the policy in the spring of 1995 by imposing an economic embargo on Iran. But AIPAC and the others wanted more. [20] The result was the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which imposed sanctions on any foreign company investing more than $40 million to develop petroleum resources in Iran or Libya.

The sanctions against Iraq came to be criticized domestically in the United States and in other countries because of the humanitarian toll that they took on civilian Iraqis. [21] The figure of 500,000 child deaths was for a long period widely cited, but recent research has shown that that figure was the result of survey data manipulated by the Saddam Hussein regime and that "there was no major rise in child mortality in Iraq after 1990 and during the period of the sanctions." [22] [23]

End

By the late 1990s, however, neoconservatives were arguing that dual containment was not enough and that regime change in Iraq was essential. By toppling Saddam and turning Iraq into a vibrant democracy, they argued that the US would trigger a far-reaching process of change throughout the Middle East. The same line of thinking was evident in the study "A Clean Break," which was written by neoconservatives for Benjamin Netanyahu although he rejected it. [20]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Saddam Hussein</span> President of Iraq from 1979 to 2003

Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti, was an Iraqi politician and revolutionary who served as the fifth president of Iraq from 1979 to 2003. He also served as prime minister of Iraq from 1979 to 1991 and later from 1994 to 2003. He was a leading member of the revolutionary Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, and later, the Baghdad-based Ba'ath Party and its regional organization, the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, which espoused Ba'athism, a mix of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">International reactions to the prelude to the Iraq War</span> Pre-war responses

This article describes the positions of world governments before the actual initiation of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and not their current positions as they may have changed since then.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">George F. Kennan</span> American diplomat, political scientist, and historian (1904–2005)

George Frost Kennan was an American diplomat and historian. He was best known as an advocate of a policy of containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War. He lectured widely and wrote scholarly histories of the relations between the USSR and the United States. He was also one of the group of foreign policy elders known as "The Wise Men".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Containment</span> American Cold War foreign policy against the spread of communism

Containment was a geopolitical strategic foreign policy pursued by the United States during the Cold War to prevent the spread of communism after the end of World War II. The name was loosely related to the term cordon sanitaire, which was containment of the Soviet Union in the interwar period.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rollback</span> Strategy of forcing a change

In political science, rollback is the strategy of forcing a change in the major policies of a state, usually by replacing its ruling regime. It contrasts with containment, which means preventing the expansion of that state; and with détente, which means developing a working relationship with that state. Most of the discussions of rollback in the scholarly literature deal with United States foreign policy toward communist countries during the Cold War. The rollback strategy was tried and was not successful in Korea in 1950 and in Cuba in 1961, but it was successful in Grenada in 1983. The United States discussed the use of rollback during the East German uprising of 1953 and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, which were ultimately crushed by the Soviet Army, but decided against it to avoid the risk of a major war.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kenneth M. Pollack</span> Political scientist and CIA analyst

Kenneth Michael Pollack is an American former CIA intelligence analyst and expert on Middle East politics and military affairs. He has served on the National Security Council staff and has written several articles and books on international relations. Currently, he is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "where he works on Middle Eastern political-military affairs, focusing in particular on Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf countries. Before that he was Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and a senior advisor at Albright Stonebridge Group, a global business strategy firm.

On 6 August 1990, four days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) placed a comprehensive embargo on Iraq. The sanctions stayed largely in force until 22 May 2003, and persisted in part, including reparations to Kuwait. The original stated purposes of the sanctions were to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, to pay reparations, and to disclose and eliminate any weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rationale for the Iraq War</span> U.S. claims and arguments for invading Iraq

There are various rationales for the Iraq War, both the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent hostilities. The George W. Bush administration began actively pressing for military intervention in Iraq in late 2001. The primary rationalization for the Iraq War was articulated by a joint resolution of the United States Congress known as the Iraq Resolution. The US claimed the intent was to "disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's alleged support for terrorism, and to supposedly free Iraqi people".

David Wurmser is an American foreign policy specialist. He served as Middle East Adviser to former US Vice President Dick Cheney, as special assistant to John R. Bolton at the State Department and as a research fellow on the Middle East at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). He served in the U.S. Navy Reserve as an intelligence officer at the rank of Lieutenant Commander.

American support for Ba'athist Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, in which it fought against post-revolutionary Iran, included several billion dollars' worth of economic aid, the sale of dual-use technology, military intelligence, and special operations training. The U.S. refused to sell arms to Iraq directly due to Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, but several sales of "dual-use" technology have been documented; notably, Iraq purchased 45 Bell helicopters for $200 million in 1985. Of particular interest for contemporary Iran–United States relations are accusations that the U.S. government actively encouraged Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, supported by a considerable amount of circumstantial evidence and generally regarded as the conventional wisdom in the Arab world, but several scholars and former U.S. government officials deny that any such collusion occurred, and no direct documentary proof of it has been found.

The foreign policy of the Bill Clinton administration was of secondary concern to a president fixed on domestic policy. He relied chiefly on his two experienced Secretaries of State Warren Christopher (1993–1997) and Madeleine Albright (1997–2001), as well as Vice President Al Gore. The Cold War had ended and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union had taken place under his predecessor President George H. W. Bush, whom Clinton criticized for being too preoccupied with foreign affairs. The United States was the only remaining superpower, with a military strength far overshadowing the rest of the world. There were tensions with countries such as Iran and North Korea, but no visible threats. Clinton's main priority was always domestic affairs, especially economics. Foreign-policy was chiefly of interest to him in terms of promoting American trade. His administration signed more than 300 bilateral trade agreements. His emergencies had to do with humanitarian crises which raised the issue of American or NATO or United Nations interventions to protect civilians, or armed humanitarian intervention, as the result of civil war, state collapse, or oppressive governments.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States foreign policy in the Middle East</span> Activities and objectives of the United States in the Middle East

United States foreign policy in the Middle East has its roots in the early 19th-century Tripolitan War that occurred shortly after the 1776 establishment of the United States as an independent sovereign state, but became much more expansive in the aftermath of World War II. With the goal of preventing the Soviet Union from gaining influence in the region during the Cold War, American foreign policy saw the deliverance of extensive support in various forms to anti-communist and anti-Soviet regimes; among the top priorities for the U.S. with regards to this goal was its support for the State of Israel against its Soviet-backed neighbouring Arab countries during the peak of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The U.S. also came to replace the United Kingdom as the main security patron for Saudi Arabia as well as the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf in the 1960s and 1970s in order to ensure, among other goals, a stable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. As of 2023, the U.S. has diplomatic relations with every country in the Middle East except for Iran, with whom relations were severed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and Syria, with whom relations were suspended in 2012 following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iraq–Saudi Arabia relations</span> Bilateral relations

Iraq–Saudi relations are the bilateral and diplomatic relations between the Republic of Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Both sovereign states share the Iraq–Saudi Arabia border.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">France–Iraq relations</span> Bilateral relations

French–Iraq relations are the relations between France and Iraq. France played a major role in Iraqi secession from the Ottoman Empire and eventual freedom from British colonial status. The Franco-Iraqi relationship is often defined by conflict and peace, with France supporting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, supporting intervention in Iraq in Operation Desert Storm, and opposing the 2003 U.S. Invasion of Iraq. As of 2004, Iraq maintains an embassy in Paris and France maintains an embassy in Baghdad and a consulate general in Erbil.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Prelude to the Iraq War</span> 1991–2003 overview of the events leading to the Iraq War

Prior to the Iraq War, the United States accused Iraq of developing weapons of mass destruction and having links with al-Qaeda. In 1991, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 was adopted and subsequent UN weapons inspectors were inside Iraq. This period also saw low-level hostilities between Iraq and the United States-led coalition from 1991–2003.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Modern history of Iraq</span> History of Iraq since World War I

After World War I, Iraq passed from the failing Ottoman Empire to British control. Kingdom of Iraq was established under the British Mandate in 1932. In the 14 July Revolution of 1958, the king was deposed and the Republic of Iraq was declared. In 1963, the Ba'ath Party staged a coup d'état and was in turn toppled by another coup in the same year, but managed to retake power in 1968. Saddam Hussein took power in 1979 and ruled Iraq for the remainder of the century, during the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, the Invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War of 1990 to 1991 and the UN sanction during the 1990s. Saddam was removed from power in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ba'athist Iraq</span> Period of Iraqi history from 1968 to 2003

Ba'athist Iraq, officially the Iraqi Republic (1968–1992) and later the Republic of Iraq (1992–2003), was the Iraqi state between 1968 and 2003 under the rule of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. This period began with high economic growth, but ended with the country facing severe levels of socio-political isolation and economic stagnation. By the late 1990s, the average annual income had decreased drastically due to a combination of external and internal factors. UNSC sanctions against Iraq, in particular, were widely criticized for negatively impacting the country's quality of life, prompting the establishment of the Oil-for-Food Programme. The Ba'athist period formally came to an end with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the Ba'ath Party has since been indefinitely banned across the country.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Joel Rayburn</span>

Joel Rayburn is a retired United States Army officer, former diplomat, and historian who served as the United States Special Envoy for Syria from 2018 to 2021. He has published books and articles about the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its results. From January to July 2021 he served as a special advisor for Middle East affairs to U.S. Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN). He is currently a Fellow in the National Security Program at the New America Foundation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict</span> Indirect conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia

Iran and Saudi Arabia are engaged in an ongoing struggle for influence in the Middle East and other regions of the Muslim world. The two countries have provided varying degrees of support to opposing sides in nearby conflicts, including the civil wars in Syria and Yemen; and disputes in Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, and Iraq. The struggle also extends to disputes or broader competition in other countries globally including in West, North and East Africa, South, Central, Southeast Asia, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.

The Gulf War began on the 2 August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The war was fought between the international coalition led by the United States of America against Iraq. Saddam Hussein's rationale behind the invasion is disputed and largely unknown. No Iraqi document has ever been discovered explicitly listing these.

References

  1. 1 2 Landpower and dual containment - rethinking America's policy in the gulf. Archived 2009-06-05 at the Wayback Machine - by Stephen C. Pelletiere, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November 1999
  2. America's Misguided Policy of Dual Containment in the Persian Gulf - Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 33, by Barbara Convay, Cato Institute, November 10, 1994
  3. Indyk, pp. 32–33.
  4. Indyk, Martin (2009-01-06). Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East . Simon & Schuster. pp.  30, 32. ISBN   9781416597254 . Retrieved 22 December 2013.
  5. Indyk, p. 32.
  6. Indyk, pp. 33–36.
  7. Indyk, pp. 36–37.
  8. Indyk, p. 38.
  9. David Von Drehle & R. Jeffrey Smith (27 June 1993). "U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush". The Washington Post . Retrieved 22 December 2013.
  10. "Transcript: President Clinton explains Iraq strike". CNN. 16 December 1998. Retrieved 22 December 2013.
  11. Indyk, p. 39.
  12. Indyk pp. 39–41.
  13. BAHGAT, GAWDAT (1997). "Beyond Containment: US–Iranian Relations at a Crossroads". Security Dialogue. 28 (4): 454 via JSTOR.
  14. Indyk, pp. 56–57.
  15. Mirhosseini, p. 37.
  16. Thalif Deen (September 27, 2000). "UN's 10-year-old Embargo on Iraq Threatens to Unravel". Common Dreams NewsCenter. Archived from the original on 28 June 2012. Retrieved 21 February 2014.
  17. Daniel Pipes (2 March 1995). "Two Cheers for Dual Containment" . Retrieved 22 December 2013.
  18. F. Gregory Gause III (March–April 1994). "The Illogic of Dual Containment". Foreign Affairs. 73 (2): 56–66. doi:10.2307/20045919.
  19. Barbara Conry (10 November 1994). "America's Misguided Policy of Dual Containment in the Persian Gulf". Cato Foreign Policy Briefing. Cato Institute. 33.
  20. 1 2 3 The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy - by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, London Review of Books, 23 March 2006
  21. Crossette, Barbara (1 December 1995). "Iraq Sanctions Kill Children, U.N. Reports". The New York Times. p. 9. Retrieved 21 February 2014.
  22. Dyson, Tim; Cetorelli, Valeria (2017-07-24). "Changing views on child mortality and economic sanctions in Iraq: a history of lies, damned lies and statistics". BMJ Global Health . 2 (2): e000311. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000311. ISSN   2059-7908. PMC   5717930 . PMID   29225933.
  23. Sly, Liz (2017-08-04). "Saddam Hussein said sanctions killed 500,000 children. That was 'a spectacular lie.'". The Washington Post . Retrieved 2020-04-22.