RAF crews periodically visited the United States for training, culminating in 21 operational training launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, 59 of the missiles, with their W491.44-megaton-of-TNT (6.0PJ)thermonuclear warheads, were brought to operational readiness. The Thor missile force was disbanded in 1963, and the missiles were returned to the United States, where most were expended in military space shots.
Implicit in Wilson's decision to develop an IRBM was that it would be based overseas. Thor had a range of 1,500 nautical miles (2,800km; 1,700mi), and therefore did not have the range to reach the Soviet Union and China from the United States.[22] Britain, Germany, Turkey, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan were considered as possible sites for them.[16]Gordon Gray, the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, mentioned it to a Ministry of Supply official in January 1956,[23] and unofficial, low-level approaches began in March 1956.[24][25] The United States Secretary of the Air Force, Donald A. Quarles, officially raised the matter with the Minister of Defence, Sir Walter Monckton, and his Chief Scientific Advisor, Sir Frederick Brundrett, in meetings at the Palace of Westminster on 16 and 17 July 1956. Quarles proposed sites in England for the missiles, and suggested that live firings be conducted from Scotland. Monckton noted that this option had already been rejected for Blue Streak, in favour of test firings at the Woomera Test Range.[24] Monckton and Brundrett considered whether Thor or Jupiter would have the range for British purposes. The Americans could not supply nuclear weapons under the McMahon Act.[26] The missiles could be fitted with British warheads, but these would be heavier, reducing the range to 1,250 nautical miles (2,320km; 1,440mi). Brundrett considered such a missile "useless".[27] The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson, queried whether Blue Streak was redundant if the Americans supplied Thor. Like many senior RAF officers and their USAF counterparts, he was also concerned about the fate of the manned bomber if the government embraced missile technology.[26]
During the initial negotiations, the major British concerns were about the technical aspects of the weapons, and the costs and benefits of deployment in the United Kingdom rather than concerns about control.[28] A precedent here was Project E, under which data on US nuclear weapons was supplied to Britain to allow English Electric Canberra bombers and V-bombers to carry them in wartime.[29] The McMahon act was amended in August 1954 to permit this.[30] Under Project E, stocks of US nuclear weapons for British use were held at RAF airbases under US custody. On 12 December 1956, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, GeneralNathan Twining, suggested to his British counterpart, Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Boyle, that the Thor missile warheads be made available "under the same terms and conditions". Sandys, now the Minister of Defence, affirmed that this arrangement would be acceptable to the British government.[29] When he visited the United States in January 1957, he found the Americans eager to deploy IRBMs in Britain.[31] The Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower agreed to do so at a summit in Bermuda in March 1957.[32] Although the IRBM negotiations had commenced before the Suez crisis damaged Britain's relationship with the United States, it suited the British government to portray the IRBM deal as a demonstration that the rift had been healed.[33]
However, the two nations were still working at cross-purposes. The British saw the IRBMs as a step on the path to an independent nuclear deterrent, while the Americans saw it as an augmentation of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The Americans originally envisaged the employment of 120 Thor missiles in four USAF squadrons, the 672nd, 673rd, 674th and 675th Strategic Missile Squadrons, and four RAF squadrons, the first two of which would at first be manned by USAF personnel.[34] The October 1957 Sputnik crisis caused this plan to be modified.[35] It placed the Eisenhower administration under great public pressure to act on the deployment of missiles by a shocked and distraught nation.[36] Sputnik demonstrated the Soviet Union's capability to deploy ICBMs. The United States now needed the IRBMs—and British cooperation—more than ever. The proposal to base USAF Thor squadrons in Britain was dropped on 12 October 1957 in view of the British political opposition.[35]
Colonel Edward N. Hall was responsible for making the arrangements for the deployment. Two alternative plans were presented to Quarles, now the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense. One was for the United States to shoulder the cost, which would facilitate the fastest possible deployment. The other was for an agreement to be reached on sharing costs with the British, which would take longer. Quarles shared the plans with Eisenhower and Macmillan in Bermuda, and directed Hall to proceed with the deployment as fast as the first plan, but with the costs of the second. The result was a slower, more costly deployment.[37] A formal agreement was drawn up on 17 December 1957, although it was not until the end of the month that it was definitely determined that Britain would receive Thor and not Jupiter missiles.[32] The deployment of Thor missiles was codenamed Project Emily.[37]
The USAF suggested that the first missiles be based at RAF Sturgate and RAF East Kirkby in Lincolnshire, where the USAF already had a presence. The RAF rejected this, as it envisaged eventually taking over the bases, and felt that they had too few suitable locations for dispersing the missiles, the local road networks were inadequate, and the personnel accommodation was below RAF standards. Instead, the RAF offered the use of RAF Feltwell in Norfolk and RAF Hemswell in Lincolnshire. The Ministry of Works costed the improvements at £7.15 million.[34] An understanding on the bases was signed by the Ambassador to the United States, Harold Caccia, and the United States Secretary of State, Christian Herter, in February 1958. This was followed by a formal agreement in June.[37] The United States would provide the missiles, spare parts and training for five years of operation. The United Kingdom would provide the bases and supporting facilities.[34]
There were fears that the involvement of the Third Air Force, the American air component based in Britain assigned to NATO, would lead to SACEUR, General Lauris Norstad, controlling the missiles. It was agreed that the missiles would be under British control, and target assignment would be a British responsibility, in conjunction with SAC's British-based 7th Air Division.[37] Nor was the RAF happy with the first units being manned by USAF. It was agreed that they would be manned by the RAF as soon as personnel could be trained to operate the missiles.[38] Each missile was supplied with its own 1.44-megaton-of-TNT (6.0PJ)Mark 49 warhead.[39] The practical difficulty with US custody of the warheads was that if they were all stored at RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk, it would take up to 57 hours to make the missiles operational. In the end, a dual key system was devised. The RAF key started the missile and the USAF authorisation officer's key armed the warhead. This reduced the launch time to 15 minutes.[39][40]
By 1958, plans called for the deployment of 60 Thor missiles. This was conceived as a four-squadron deployment, with each squadron controlling fifteen missiles in five flights of three missiles, with each flight at its own RAF station. No. 77 Squadron RAF was formed at RAF Feltwell as part of No. 3 Group RAF on 1 September 1958. Its first Thor missile arrived at RAF Lakenheath on a Douglas C-124 Globemaster II transport aircraft on 29 August, and was delivered to RAF Feltwell on 19 September. Fourteen were received by 23 December 1958.[42] The deployment involved the transport of 18,000,000 pounds (8,200t) of equipment by sea, 23,000,000 to 25,000,000 pounds (10,000 to 11,000t) by air in 600 flights by C-124 Globemaster IIs, and 77 by Douglas C-133 Cargomasters of the USAF's 1607th Air Transport Wing.[43]
Eastern England was dotted with RAF stations that had been used by RAF Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force in the Combined Bomber Offensive during the Second World War. Many were still being used by the RAF and USAF, while others had been turned over to other uses but were still in good condition.[44] The use of government-owned land saved the costs of land acquisition.[42]RAF Witchford was initially included at the instigation of the Americans, but the land was owned by the Church Commissioners, and nearby RAF Mepal was substituted. The main selection criterion was the condition of the road network connecting the bases; a grade of more than one in seventeen was considered an unacceptable risk of grounding the missile transport.[44] Some proposed sites in Yorkshire based around RAF Dishforth ran into problems with radar coverage, and a new group of stations was found around RAF North Luffenham. These were not considered ideal as the missiles would have to fly over populated areas.[45]
Training and demonstrations were conducted by Douglas Aircraft engineers, and responsibility for the base was handed over to the RAF in March 1959. In July, it was decided that each of the locations would be designated as a squadron instead of a flight. The flights of No. 77 Squadron became a separate squadron on 22 July 1959.[42] A Flight remained No. 77 Squadron RAF, while B, C, D and E Flights became Nos. 82, 107, 113 and 220 Squadrons RAF respectively.[46]
The subsequent deployment was based on four stations, each comprising five missile squadrons, with a main base and four satellite bases in close proximity. Each missile squadron was equipped with three Thor missiles. The squadrons were allocated to the two RAF Bomber Command groups, Nos. 1 and 3 Groups. The first squadron in No. 1 Group was No. 97 Squadron RAF,[42] which was formed at RAF Hemswell on 1 December 1959.[47] As with No. 77 Squadron, it was broken up into five squadrons on 22 July 1959, with Nos. 104, 106, 142 and 269 Squadrons RAF being formed. No. 98 Squadron RAF was formed at RAF Driffield on 1 August 1959 as part of No. 1 Group on with Nos. 102, 150, 226 and 240 Squadrons RAF as its satellites.[42][48] Finally, No. 144 Squadron RAF was formed at RAF North Luffenham on 1 December 1959 with Nos. 130, 150, 223 and 254 Squadrons RAF as its satellites as part of No. 3 Group. In all, twenty RAF squadrons were formed between September 1958 and December 1959, more than in any comparable period in peacetime.[42]
Thor missile deployment showing the main stations (blue) and the satellites (red)
The raising of the twenty squadrons involved the training of 1,254 RAF personnel in the United States, and about the same number in the United Kingdom.[49] Both RAF and USAF personnel were trained in the United States by the 392nd Strategic Missile Squadron (Training), which was formed at Cooke Air Force Base in California on 23 May 1957,[lower-alpha 1] and assigned to the 704th Strategic Missile Wing. Both were assigned to the 1st Missile Division on 22 July. The squadron was renamed the 392nd Missile Training Squadron on 12 August, and was activated on 15 September.[51][52]
Training was provided by Douglas Aircraft and A. C. Sparkplug at the former's plant in Tucson, Arizona.[53] The 672nd Strategic Missile Squadron, which was renamed the 672nd Technical Training Squadron on 25 April 1958, was formed at Cooke Air Force Base on 1 January 1958, and moved to RAF Feltwell on 20 May 1958, and then to RAF Lakenheath on 17 August 1959, where it was disbanded on 1 October 1959.[52][54]
RAF Bomber Command established a Strategic Missile School at RAF Feltwell in January 1961, and in May responsibility for Thor missile training passed from the USAF to the RAF. The school conducted courses for launch control officers, technical officers, authentication officers, missile serving chiefs and missile, general and electrical fitters. The final course—for launch control officers—graduated on 15 November 1962, and the school was closed.[55]
Launch of Thor T-220 from Complex 75-1-1 on 21 October 1959
The culmination of Thor missile training was to participate in a missile launch. Originally it was intended that all Thor missile crews would carry out at least one launch, but it soon became apparent that the cost would be prohibitive. Nonetheless, 21 RAF crews visited the United States for training, culminating in operational training launches from Vandenberg. This was known as Integrated Weapons System Training (IWST). During the testing and for the avoidance of doubt, the Americans were at pains to ensure standardisation of terminology between themselves and their UK colleagues. The first of these launches was a launch codenamed Lions Roar. Despite the fact that a Thor missile had exploded on the launch pad just a few days before, the launch was viewed by dignitaries including Brigadier Godfrey Hobbs, the Director of Public Relations at the Ministry of Defence; Air Vice-Marshal Walter Sheen, the RAF commander at the British Joint Staff Mission; and Air Vice-Marshal Augustus Walker, the commander of No. 1 Group. After delays due to weather and technical problems, the missile was successfully launched on 16 April 1959.[78][79] In all, there were nine IWST launches, the last of which, codenamed Red Caboose, was on 21 January 1960.[80]
In addition to the IWST launches, there were Combat Training Launches (CTLs). IWST launches were part of training, and launch crews were permitted technical holds in the countdown so they could be fully trained in launch procedures. A CTL was for an already trained crew, and was to demonstrate their proficiency.[80] The first launch was viewed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the FleetLord Mountbatten and Lady Mountbatten. The first three CTLs, like the IWST launches, used Douglas missiles taken off the assembly line; but there were concerns about the impact of the British weather on the missiles. Henceforth, a missile would be randomly chosen, and the missile and its crew flown to Vandenberg for testing. Twelve CTLs were carried out between 6 October 1959 and 18 June 1962; a planned CTL on 8 October 1962 was cancelled in the wake of the decision to withdraw the Thor missiles from service.[81]
The deployment of Jupiter IRBMs to Italy and Turkey in 1961 led to the Soviet Union responding by attempting to deploy IRBMs in Cuba.[84] Their discovery by the United States led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAC was placed on DEFCON 3 on 22 October 1962, and DEFCON 2 on 24 October. RAF Bomber Command moved to Alert Condition 3, equivalent to DEFCON 3, on 27 October. Normally between 45 and 50 Thor missiles were ready to fire in 15 minutes. Without altering the alert condition, the number of missiles ready to fire in 15 minutes was increased to 59, the only exception being a missile used for training at RAF Feltwell. The dual key system was thereby put under strain due to the RAF and USAF personnel being on different states of readiness.[85][86] Under the war plan that had gone into effect on 1 August 1962, the RAF's bombers and Thor missiles targeted 16 cities, 44 airfields, 10 air defence control centres and 20 IRBM sites.[87] The crisis passed, and SAC reverted to DEFCON 3 on 21 November and DEFCON 4 on 24 November. In the aftermath of the crisis, RAF Bomber Command ordered that in future 39 missiles would be on 15-minute readiness, with the Feltwell station maintaining nine on alert and the other three stations keeping ten.[85][86]
Termination
The RAF high command never warmed to missiles, and always ranked them secondary to the V-bomber force. The missile bases were separate from the rest of the RAF and its personnel considered outside the mainstream. Project Emily gave the RAF considerable experience in missile operations, but the cancellation of Blue Streak on 2 February 1960 in favour of Skybolt, an air-launched ballistic missile, rendered this expertise of dubious value.[88] Given the amount of time and money spent on Thor, consideration was given to extending the deployment. Responding to the arguments made for and against Blue Streak, there were proposals for improving Thor. If the missiles were already fuelled, then they could be launched in as little as 60 seconds, but they could only remain fuelled for two hours, after which components froze from contact with the liquid oxygen. The missiles then needed six hours to thaw out. It was impractical to base them underground, but being above ground made them very vulnerable to a nuclear attack.[89] Yet the twenty Thor missiles squadrons were equivalent to seven and a half squadrons of V-bombers. Without them, there would be just fourteen V-bombers on quick alert.[90]
Under the original agreement, the USAF paid the cost of maintenance for the missiles for five years. After this costs would fall on the United Kingdom, which would have to take over their logistic support. With ICBMs becoming available, the Americans did not foresee the Thor missiles making a substantial contribution to the westernnuclear deterrent after 1965. On 1 May 1962, the United States Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, informed the Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, that the United States would not provide support for Thor after 31 October 1964. Watkinson then informed him that the system would be phased out. An Air Council meeting on 31 May 1962 decided that Project Emily should be terminated by the end of 1963. A public announcement was made on 1 August 1962.[91] McNamara's decision on 7 November 1962 to cancel Skybolt—approved by President John F. Kennedy on 23 November—left the RAF without a successor to Thor.[92] The British government then negotiated the Nassau Agreement to buy Polaris. The future of the British strategic nuclear deterrent now lay with the Royal Navy,[93] and the last Thor squadrons were inactivated on 23 August 1963.[94]
The Thor missiles were flown back to the United States, and refurbished at the Douglas Aircraft plant in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The engines were removed and refurbished by Rocketdyne. Although no Thor missiles were launched by the RAF with nuclear warheads, seven were launched with live nuclear warheads as part of Operation Fishbowl in 1962, two of which were former RAF missiles. Of the seven attempts, only three were successful. Another 55 former RAF Thor missiles were expended in military space shots between 18 September 1963 and 15 July 1980.[95]As of 2017[update], three ex-RAF Thor missiles remained. One was in the Royal Air Force Museum Cosford,[96] one in the National Museum of the United States Air Force,[97] and one at Vandenberg Air Force Base.[41]
In October 2012 the former launch sites at RAF Harrington and RAF North Luffenham were granted listed status.[98]
Footnotes
↑ Cooke Air Force Base was renamed Vandenberg Air Force Base on 4 October 1958.[50]
1 2 3 4 Pads 75-2-6, 75-2-7 and 75-2-8 were renamed LE-6, LE-7 and LE-8 respectively in September 1961.[83]
The "V bombers" were the Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft during the 1950s and 1960s that comprised the United Kingdom's strategic nuclear strike force known officially as the V force or Bomber Command Main Force. The three models of strategic bomber, known collectively as the V class, were the Vickers Valiant, which first flew in 1951 and entered service in 1955; the Avro Vulcan, which first flew in 1952 and entered service in 1956; and the Handley Page Victor, which first flew in 1952 and entered service in 1957. The V Bomber force reached its peak in June 1964 with 50 Valiants, 70 Vulcans and 39 Victors in service.
The PGM-17A Thor was the first operative ballistic missile of the United States Air Force (USAF). It was named after the Norse god of thunder. It was deployed in the United Kingdom between 1959 and September 1963 as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with thermonuclear warheads. Thor was 65 feet (20 m) in height and 8 feet (2.4 m) in diameter.
The Nassau Agreement, concluded on 21 December 1962, was an agreement negotiated between President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, and Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to end the Skybolt Crisis. A series of meetings between the two leaders over three days in the Bahamas followed Kennedy's announcement of his intention to cancel the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile project. The US agreed to supply the UK with Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles for the UK Polaris programme.
The PGM-19 Jupiter was the first nuclear armed, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) of the United States Air Force (USAF). It was a liquid-propellant rocket using RP-1 fuel and LOX oxidizer, with a single Rocketdyne LR79-NA rocket engine producing 667 kilonewtons (150,000 lbf) of thrust. It was armed with the 1.44 megatons of TNT (6.0 PJ) W49 nuclear warhead. The prime contractor was the Chrysler Corporation.
Sculthorpe Training Area, previously Royal Air Force Station Sculthorpe and commonly abbreviated RAF Sculthorpe, is a training site owned by the British Ministry of Defence (MoD). It is approximately 3 miles west of Fakenham in the county of Norfolk in England. It forms part of the Defence Training Estate.
Royal Air Force Feltwell or more simply RAF Feltwell is a Royal Air Force station in Norfolk, East Anglia that is used by the United States Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa. The station is located about 10 miles west of Thetford, and is in the borough of King's Lynn and West Norfolk at approximate Ordnance Survey grid reference TL 715 900. A former Second World War bomber station, the airfield is used as a housing estate for United States Air Force personnel stationed nearby at RAF Mildenhall.
Royal Air Force Folkingham or RAF Folkingham is a former Royal Air Force station located south west of Folkingham, Lincolnshire and about 29 miles (47 km) due south of county town Lincoln and 112 miles (180 km) north of London, England.
Royal Air Force North Pickenham or more simply RAF North Pickenham is a former Royal Air Force station located 3 miles (4.8 km) East of Swaffham, Norfolk, England.
Royal Air Force Harrington or more simply RAF Harrington is a former Royal Air Force station in England about 5.6 miles (9.0 km) west of Kettering in Northamptonshire south of the village of Harrington off the A14 road. During the early Cold War, it was a Thor missile site, designed to deliver atomic warheads to the Soviet Union. The nuclear missile site is now protected as a Grade II listed building as an example of Cold War architecture.
The wing's first predecessor is the 5th Combat Crew Replacement Center Group, a former Army Air Forces unit. This group was activated in England during World War II and trained replacement crews for Eighth Air Force until it was disbanded in 1944.
Between 1948 and 1992, personnel and aircraft of the United States Air Force (USAF) Strategic Air Command (SAC) were routinely deployed to bases in England. An informal agreement to base SAC bombers in the UK was reached between US General Carl Spaatz, and Marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Lord Tedder, in July 1946. At that time there were only three bases in the UK deemed suitable for operating Boeing B-29 Superfortresses: RAF Lakenheath, RAF Marham and RAF Sculthorpe. These were airbases that had been extended during World War II when there were plans to use B-29s against Germany. When the Berlin Blockade began in June 1948, two B-29 groups deployed to the UK, but neither was equipped with Silverplate bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Nuclear-capable Boeing B-50 Superfortress bombers began deploying in 1949, and nuclear bombs followed in 1950.
Royal Air Force Coleby Grange or more simply RAF Coleby Grange was a Royal Air Force satellite station situated alongside the western edge of the A15 on open heathland between the villages of Coleby and Nocton Heath and lying 7.4 mi (11.9 km) due south of the county town Lincoln, Lincolnshire, England.
Project E was a joint project between the United States and the United Kingdom during the Cold War to provide nuclear weapons to the Royal Air Force (RAF) until sufficient British nuclear weapons became available. It was subsequently expanded to provide similar arrangements for the British Army of the Rhine. A maritime version of Project E known as Project N provided nuclear depth bombs used by the RAF Coastal Command.
No. 82 Squadron RAF was a Royal Air Force squadron that was first formed in 1917 and last disbanded in 1963. It served at times as a bomber unit, a reconnaissance unit and lastly as an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) unit.
No. 144 Squadron RAF was a squadron of the British Royal Air Force. It was first formed in 1918 during the First World War, operating as a bomber squadron in the Middle East. It reformed in 1937, serving in the bomber and anti-shipping roles during the Second World War. A third incarnation saw the squadron serving as a strategic missile squadron during the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The 644th Bomb Squadron is an inactive United States Air Force unit. It was last assigned to the 410th Bombardment Wing at K. I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan, where it was inactivated on 21 November 1994.
No. 142 Squadron was a flying squadron of the Royal Air Force (RAF).
No. 226 Squadron RAF was a unit of the British Royal Air Force that existed as a bomber squadron during the First and Second World Wars, and as part of the UK's nuclear ballistic missile force in the early 1960s.
Royal Air Force Shepherds Grove or more simply RAF Shepherds Grove is a former Royal Air Force station located in Suffolk, active from 1943–44 to 1966. Shepherds Grove was host to units of the United States Army Air Forces, Eighth Air Force. During the Cold war it was also one of the 20 Thor IRBM missile bases in the UK, as part of Project Emily.
In 1952, the United Kingdom was the third country to develop and test nuclear weapons, after the United States and Soviet Union. and is one of the five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
References
Baylis, John; Stoddart, Kristan (2015). The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs, Culture, and Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-870202-3.
Botti, Timothy J. (1987). The Long Wait: the Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945–58. Contributions in Military Studies. New York: Greenwood Press. ISBN978-0-313-25902-9. OCLC464084495.
Boyes, John (2015). Thor Ballistic Missile: The United States and the United Kingdom in Partnership. Fonthill. ISBN978-1-78155-481-4. OCLC921523156.
Cathcart, Brian (1995). Test of Greatness: Britain's Struggle for the Atom Bomb. London: John Murray. ISBN0-7195-5225-7. OCLC31241690.
Clark, Ian; Angell, David (1991). "Britain, the United States and the Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Diplomacy of the Thor Deployment 1956–58". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 2 (3): 153–177. doi:10.1080/09592299108405832. ISSN0959-2296.
Goldberg, Alfred (July 1964). "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent". International Affairs. 40 (3): 409–429. doi:10.2307/2610825. JSTOR2610825.
Jones, Jeffrey (2017). Volume I: From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964. The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge. ISBN978-1-138-67493-6.
Moore, Richard (2010). Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons 1958–64. Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN978-0-230-21775-1. OCLC705646392.
Navias, Martin S. (1991). British Weapons and Strategic Planning, 1955–1958. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-827754-5. OCLC22506593.
Paul, Septimus H. (2000). Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941–1952. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. ISBN978-0-8142-0852-6. OCLC43615254.
Wynn, Humphrey (1997). RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces, Their Origins, Roles and Deployment, 1946–1969. A documentary history. London: The Stationery Office. ISBN0-11-772833-0.
Young, Ken (Spring 2007). "A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning". Journal of Cold War Studies. 9 (2): 5–31. doi:10.1162/jcws.2007.9.2.5. S2CID57563082.
Young, Ken (2016). The American Bomb in Britain: US Air Forces' Strategic Presence 1946–64. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN978-0-7190-8675-5. OCLC942707047.
Further reading
Wilson, Jim (2008). Launch Pad UK: Britain and the Cuban Missile Crisis. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Aviation. ISBN978-1-84415-799-0. OCLC852003892.
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