Droop quota

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In the study of electoral systems, the Droop quota (sometimes called the Hagenbach-Bischoff, Britton, or Newland-Britton quota [1] [lower-alpha 1] ) is the minimum number of votes needed for a party or candidate to guarantee they will win at least one seat in a legislature. [3] [4]

Contents

The Droop quota generalizes the concept of a majority to multiwinner elections. Just as a candidate with a majority (any number exceeding half of all votes) is guaranteed to be declared winner in a one-on-one election, a candidate who holds more than one Droop quota's worth of votes at any point is guaranteed to win a seat in a multiwinner election. [4]

Besides establishing winners, the Droop quota is used to define the number of excess votes, i.e. votes not needed by a candidate who has been declared elected. In proportional quota-rule systems such as STV or expanding approvals, these excess votes can be transferred to other candidates, preventing them from being wasted. [4]

The Droop quota was first suggested by the English lawyer and mathematician Henry Richmond Droop (1831–1884) as an alternative to the Hare quota. [4]

Today, the Droop quota is used in almost all STV elections, including those in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, Malta, and Australia.[ citation needed ] It is also used in South Africa to allocate seats by the largest remainder method. [4]

Standard Formula

The exact form of the Droop quota for a -winner election is given by the expression: [1] [5]

In the case of a single-winner election, this reduces to the familiar simple majority rule. Under such a rule, a candidate can be declared elected as soon as they have more than 50% of the vote, i.e. . [1]

Sometimes, the Droop quota is written as a share of all votes, in which case it has value 1k+1. A candidate holding strictly more than one full Droop quota's worth of votes is guaranteed to win a seat. In cases where the tie for the final seat is broken by taking a limit, the quota is sometimes defined by abuse of notation as:

Derivation

The Droop quota can be derived by considering what would happen if k candidates (called "Droop winners") have exceeded the Droop quota; the goal is to identify whether an outside candidate could defeat any of these candidates. In this situation, if each quota winner's share of the vote exceeds1k+1, while all unelected candidates' share of the vote, taken together, is less than1k+1 votes. Thus, even if there were only one unelected candidate who held all the remaining votes, they would not be able to defeat any of the Droop winners. [4]

Example in STV

The following election has 3 seats to be filled by single transferable vote. There are 4 candidates: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Aaron Burr. There are 102 voters, but two of the votes are spoiled.

The total number of valid votes is 100, and there are 3 seats. The Droop quota is therefore . These votes are as follows:

45 voters20 voters25 voters10 voters
1WashingtonBurrJeffersonHamilton
2HamiltonJeffersonBurrWashington
3JeffersonWashingtonWashingtonJefferson

First preferences for each candidate are tallied:

Only Washington has strictly more than 25 votes. As a result, he is immediately elected. Washington has 20 excess votes that can be transferred to their second choice, Hamilton. The tallies therefore become:

Hamilton is elected, so his excess votes are redistributed. Thanks to Hamilton's support, Jefferson receives 30 votes to Burr's 20 and is elected.

If all of Hamilton's supporters had instead backed Burr, the election for the last seat would have been exactly tied, instead of a clear win for Jefferson, requiring a tiebreaker.

Common errors

There is a great deal of confusion among legislators and political observers about the exact form of the Droop quota. [6] At least six different versions appear in various legal codes or definitions of the quota, all varying by one vote. [6] Such versions have been discouraged by the ERS handbook since 1976. [1] Common variants include:

The first variant arises from Droop's discussion in the context of cumulative voting, where each voter would cast votes, [4] leading Droop to describe his quota as "the whole number next greater than the quotient obtained by dividing , the number of votes, by ". [6] In the ideal case with taken to be arbitrarily large (i.e. if votes can be divided into arbitrary fractions), this approaches the exact Droop quota. The remaining variants arose as transcription or communication errors in copying Droop's quota. [6]

Spoiled ballots should not be included when calculating the Droop quota; however, some jurisdictions fail to correctly specify this in their election administration laws.[ citation needed ]

Confusion with the Hare quota

The Droop quota is often confused with the more intuitive Hare quota. While the Droop quota gives the number of voters needed to mathematically guarantee a candidate's election, the Hare quota gives the number of voters represented by each winner in an ideally-proportional system, i.e. one where every voter is treated equally. As a result, the Hare quota tends to give more proportional outcomes, [7] while the Droop quota is more biased towards large parties than any other admissible quota. [7]

The confusion between the two quotas originates from a fencepost error, caused by forgetting unelected candidates can also have votes at the end of the counting process. In the case of a single-winner election, misapplying the Hare quota would lead to the incorrect conclusion that a candidate must receive 100% of the vote to be certain of victory; in reality, any votes exceeding a bare majority are excess votes. [4]

The Droop quota is today the most popular quota for STV elections.[ citation needed ]

See also

Notes

  1. Some authors use the terms "Newland-Britton quota" or "exact Droop quota" to refer to the quantity described in this article, and reserve the term "Droop quota" for the rounded Droop quota (the original form in the works of Henry Droop). [2]

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References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Lundell, Jonathan; Hill, ID (October 2007). "Notes on the Droop quota" (PDF). Voting Matters (24): 3–6.
  2. Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017). "Quota Methods of Apportionment: Divide and Rank". Proportional Representation. pp. 95–105. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_5. ISBN   978-3-319-64706-7.
  3. "Droop Quota", The Encyclopedia of Political Science, 2300 N Street, NW, Suite 800, Washington DC 20037 United States: CQ Press, 2011, doi:10.4135/9781608712434.n455, ISBN   978-1-933116-44-0 , retrieved 2024-05-03{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Droop, Henry Richmond (1881). "On methods of electing representatives" (PDF). Journal of the Statistical Society of London . 44 (2): 141–196 [Discussion, 197–202]. doi:10.2307/2339223. JSTOR   2339223. Reprinted in Voting matters Issue 24 (October 2007) pp. 7–46.
  5. Woodall, Douglass. "Properties of Preferential Election Rules". Voting Matters (3).
  6. 1 2 3 4 Dančišin, Vladimír (2013). "Misinterpretation of the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota". Annales Scientia Politica. 2 (1): 76.
  7. 1 2 Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.), "Favoring Some at the Expense of Others: Seat Biases", Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 127–147, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_7, ISBN   978-3-319-64707-4 , retrieved 2024-05-10

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Further reading